The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, Issue 3 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2009-10
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI,
Issue 3
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11871
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 16, Number 3, Part 1 (October 15, 2009) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Diarchy’s collective policy formulated in Security Council 
This week, foreign policy issues greatly preoccupied Russia’s leaders.  President 
Medvedev held discussions with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while 
Prime Minister Putin paid a multi-day visit to China to pursue the “Russian-
Chinese energy dialogue” and to attend a Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
meeting. (1) 
 
The talks between Medvedev and Clinton (and also between Clinton and 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov) aimed at working out a joint policy toward Iran 
– notably a more stringent sanctions regime.  It appears that the talks failed to 
establish a coordinated approach to sanctions, nor was there even agreement on 
the need for sanctions at this time.  Secretary of State Clinton did claim that the 
discussions revealed that Russia’s leaders get it—that there is recognition of Iran 
as potentially posing a threat—and further, that “we are also in agreement that if 
our diplomatic engagement is not successful then we have to look at other 
measures to take, including sanctions to try to pressure the Iranians." (2)  
 
It seems the most hopeful signs from the Russian leadership on the question of 
sanctions against Iran came from Medvedev…in September.  At a press 
conference following a meeting with US President Obama in New York, 
Medvedev had suggested that there might be a need to take action with regard to 
Iran: "Russia's position is clear: Sanctions rarely lead to productive results, but in 
some cases sanctions are inevitable."  (3) 
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Meanwhile, Prime Minister Putin, who brought his siloviki compatriot Igor Sechin 
along on his trip to China, met with China’s President Hu Jintao, as well as with 
Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s 
Congress.  By the second day of meetings, Russia reportedly had signed 
approximately 40 contracts with Chinese businesses, said to be worth $3.5 
billion. (4) 
 
More than the business deals arranged with China, however, Putin’s visit 
captured headlines for his comments on the status of the talks back in Moscow 
over sanctions on Iran.  “On the whole, I believe that we need to talk and seek 
compromises.  If they are not found, we will see what to do next,” Putin remarked 
at a press conference in Beijing.  (5)  As for the imposition of sanctions at this 
point, he said, “I think it would be premature.” (6) 
 
Putin’s comments presented two problems:  On the one hand, they did not 
confirm the atmosphere of mutual agreement on the threat posed by Iran, as 
portrayed by the US side after the Moscow talks; on the other hand, they seemed 
to reveal a striking difference on a significant foreign policy issue within Russia’s 
tandem team.  
 
The prime minister attempted to alleviate any suggestion of discord with the 
president by a facile reconciliation of Medvedev’s statements with his own:  “[I]f 
Dmitriy Anatolyevich [Medvedev] says that they [sanctions] are inevitable, then 
they are inevitable.  (…) But if you take a close look at his statements and the 
context in which they were made, I am sure you will see that he is not bent on 
pursuing a policy of sanctions.”  (7) 
 
When prompted by a reporter, Putin clarified for his audience the division of 
authority within the tandem: “The president of the Russian Federation determines 
our foreign policy.” (8)  Putin continued, by way of explanation, to describe how 
foreign policy is hammered out in Russia: “We discuss this issue [Iran] 
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collectively at the meetings of the Security Council.” (9)  As to his coordination 
with the president, Putin asserted,  "I know Dmitriy Anatolyevich's position. It is 
being formulated collectively.” (10) 
 
The issue of how and where foreign policy is formulated in Russia is particularly 
thorny while Russia’s political array is dominated by an apparent diarchical 
chimera.  Beyond the difficulties of protocol, during any international crisis, it 
would be critical to know with whom to address questions of any urgency.   
 
President Medvedev attempted to put doubts about his independence of action to 
rest last month during an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN: "Foreign policy? 
Only one man does it in this country, the president... Naturally, all the directives, 
all the decisions are adopted by the president." (11) 
 
This well may be so, but if the policy is fixed in the Security Council, a body 
dominated by the prime minister’s siloviki friends and appointees, and notably led 
by Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who was the Director of Russia’s Security 
Services during all of Putin’s presidency, how independent is President 
Medvedev’s authority in this sphere?  
 
At a Security Council meeting this summer, Medvedev was said to have 
presented forcefully on the subject of Russia’s role in developing advanced 
computer technologies.  The topic was so crucial that the report noted the 
unusual behavior of the prime minister.  “Even Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
came to discuss it.  Moreover, while usually entering meetings one minute after 
the president, this time, though Putin didn’t wait for the beginning of the meeting 
with the other members of the Security Council, he came a full six minutes 
earlier.” (12-Emphasis added)  It seems a safe assumption that the other 
members of the Security Council usually refrain from discussing business until 
one minute after most of the members are seated. 
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It appears, once again, that despite the formal, constitutional distinctions 
between the positions of president and prime minister, Putin still is the boss.  
This week, he managed to demonstrate this fact to the world, while 
simultaneously stating almost the exact opposite.   Now, that is talent. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) RIA-Novosti, 11 Oct 09 459 GMT +3 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) “Clinton: Russia sees Iran threat,” BBC World Service, 14 Oct 09 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8307208.stm. 
(3) “Medvedev signals openness to Iran Sanctions after Talks,” CNNPolitics.com, 
23 Sep 09 via 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/23/us.russia.iran/index.html. 
(4) Russia and China Sign Trade Deals,” BBC News (Business), 13 Oct 09 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8304084.stm. 
(5) “Putin says too early to consider sanctions against Iran,” RIA-Novosti, 14 Oct 
09, 9:09 GMT +3, 14 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) “Putin says discussing sanctions against Iran would be premature,” 14 Oct 
09, 8:03 pm EST, UTAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) “Russian president determines foreign policy on Iran – Putin,” Interfax news 
agency, Moscow, in Russian 1511 gmt 14 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) “Putin says discussing sanctions against Iran would be premature,” ibid. 
(10) “Russian president determines foreign policy on Iran – Putin,” ibid. 
(11) “Russian president denies Putin has all the power,” ccn.com Europe, 18 Sep 
09 via 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/09/18/russia.medvedev/index.html. 
(12) “Medvedev’s pedaflop,” by Vera Sitnina, Vremya novostey, 29 Jul 09; 
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Thousands protest the modernization of Saint Petersburg. Again.  
Central Saint Petersburg was host to one of the city’s largest protests in recent 
memory last Saturday as more than three thousand angry Russians gathered to 
voice their displeasure over proposed changes to the city skyline. Last month, 
city officials led by governor Valentina Matviyenko approved plans to construct a 
77-story tower on the banks of the Large Okhta River in Saint Petersburg’s 
historic city center. State-run energy firm Gazprom is sponsoring construction, 
which will cost approximately $2.4 billion. (1) 
 
This is not the first time that the government has clashed with the public over 
Saint Petersburg’s skyline. Emperor Peter the Great founded the city in 1703 and 
spent the next twenty-two years shaping it with architects Domenico Trezzini and 
Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond. Peter’s western-influenced style, known 
internationally as Petrine Baroque, sparked protests from the older members of 
the Russian nobility and resulted in accusations of treason and several attempts 
on Peter’s life. (2) Similar protests have marked each evolution since Peter’s 
death. In 1762, the Commission of Stone Buildings in Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg ruled that no structure would stand higher than the Winter Palace. 
After the Soviets came to power in the 1920s, Leningrad (as Saint Petersburg 
was renamed in 1924) became known as “the cradle of the revolution” and 
hosted more constructivist kommunalka communal apartments than any other 
city in Russia. (3) The rise of Stalinist architecture and World War II, particularly 
the Siege of Leningrad, further shaped the city’s skyline. Throughout each 
evolution, however, the historic center of the city remained largely untouched. 
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Saint Petersburg’s reputation as an historic and architectural hub continued to 
grow throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In 1990, the UNESCO 
World Heritage Centre named the city’s historic center an official World Heritage 
Site for its “numerous canals and more than 400 bridges” and because “its 
architectural heritage reconciles the very different Baroque and pure neoclassical 
styles.” (4) The controversy over the Okhta Center stems from this honor, or 
rather, the fear of losing it. Although more than 8000 architectural monuments 
remain in Saint Petersburg, the last two decades have seen many of the city’s 
landmarks destroyed in order to make room for new buildings like the Okhta 
Center. Many observers view these projects as threats to the local historical and 
architectural environment. (5) 
 
Discussions of the Okhta Tower between Gazprom and the Russian government 
have been ongoing since 2007, despite the World Heritage Committee’s official 
request to both parties to halt the planned construction. At the time, the 
committee objected to the potential threat to “the outstanding universal value of 
this property,” and asked that an alternative design “respecting the value and 
spirit of this historic city” be considered. (6) Since then, British architectural firm 
RMJM has released plans for a ‘needle-like’ multifaceted, twisting glass tower 
that will change color according to the light. (7) The building would sit on the 
banks of the Okhta River not far from the Smolny Cathedral. 
 
Despite UNESCO’s admonition, there is something to be gained from Gazprom’s 
project: the Okhta Center could bring Saint Petersburg’s economy a much-
needed boost. Even before the economic crisis began last fall, the city 
consistently had lagged behind Moscow in terms of economic development. The 
new building will serve as Gazprom’s world headquarters and bring thousands of 
workers to the city. To some, this is incentive enough to press on, despite 
protests from those who believe that the potential benefits do not outweigh the 
threat to the city aesthetic. Gazprom made over $23.3 billion last year, which 
makes it not only one of Russia’s most successful and powerful companies, but 
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the world’s largest natural gas provider. (8) Another potential economic benefit of 
the Okhta Center is that the tower presumably would stimulate Saint 
Petersburg’s tourist trade, especially if the controversy over the planned 
construction translates into increased publicity. 
 
While popular response to the planned construction of the Okhta Center has 
been overwhelmingly negative, the public sector’s reaction has been mixed. 
Saint Petersburg’s longtime governor Valentina Matviyenko, who understandably 
appears eager to cement her city’s ties with Gazprom, has championed the plan. 
Prime Minister Putin also has supported the project since its inception. Russia’s 
Cultural Ministry, on the other hand, has objected both to the design and location 
and also has called on prosecutors to review the project’s approval process for 
illegal activities. Culture Minister Alexander Avdeyev alleges that the approval 
process violated federal law, but has failed to provide specifics. (9) Members 
from Russia’s opposition parties, notably the Communist and Yabloko parties, 
attended Saturday’s massive demonstration and joined the public in waving signs 
that said “Gazprom go home” and “History is worth more than money.” (10) 
 
The protests on Saturday ended with attendees voting to approve a resolution to 
have President Dmitry Medvedev stop construction on the tower and also called 
for Matviyenko’s resignation. (11) Despite the size and force of the demonstration 
and poll results from earlier in the week showing that more than three-fourths of 
the city’s residents believe that the skyline should not change, (12) the Kremlin 
has declined to comment on the situation, and in fact the government’s role in the 
project has been minimized. Unlike Medvedev’s plan to modernize Moscow and 
make it a world financial center, which has all but stopped in the wake of the 
financial crisis, (13) the Okhta Center in St. Petersburg will be funded by a third 
party (even if said party is government-owned). Presumably, the only reason why 
Medvedev would interrupt the project now would be to heed the public’s call to 
“leave to descendants ‘the City of Peter’ instead of [a] depersonalized modern 
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megacity.” (14) With little to lose and everything to gain, however, an injunction of 
this kind appears highly unlikely. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Marina Koreneva, “Mass rally in St. Petersburg against skyscraper plan,” 
American Foreign Press, 13 Oct 09 via 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j6Myb2rfInoJAj7n7URsBA
UHIIZg. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(2) "History of the City," Official Portal: Administration of St. Petersburg, 20 May 
08 via http://gov.spb.ru/culture/history. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(3) “History of St. Petersburg,” Wikipedia: St. Petersburg, 12 Oct 09 via 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Petersburg. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(4) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “Historic 
Centre of Saint Petersburg and Related Groups of Monuments,” UNESCO - 
World Heritage, 1990 via http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/540. Last accessed 14 Oct 
09. 
(5) Sergey V. Zagraevsky, “Will Saint Petersburg Share the Same Fate as 
Moscow?” 08 via http://zagraevsky.com/piter_engl.htm. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(6) “UNESCO World Heritage Centre confirms opposition to building of a tower in 
the Historic Centre of St. Petersburg,” UNESCO – World Heritage, 18 Jan 08 via 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/411. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(7) “Mass rally in St. Petersburg against skyscraper plan,” Ibid.  
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Irina Titova, “Russia: Protest in St. Petersburg over skyscraper,” Associated 
Press, 13 Oct 09 via http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jpjEW 
SXmE7hMTCCXu4XhEhlGvHNAD9B89KIO0. Last accessed 14 Oct 09. 
(10) “Mass rally in St. Petersburg against skyscraper plan,” Ibid.  
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Russia: Protest in St. Petersburg over skyscraper,” Ibid. 
(13) Rose Monacelli, "Economic Update: What Riots?" The ISCIP Analyst, 
Volume XV, Number 15, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and 
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Policy, 20 Aug 09 via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1515.shtml#domestic. Last accessed 14 
Oct 09. 
(14) “Will Saint. Petersburg Share the Same Fate as Moscow?” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign and Security Issues 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Iran & START progress? 
On 29 September, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart, 
Manouchehr Mottaki in New York. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare for 
the so-called “Sextet” talks on the Iranian nuclear issue, due to begin in Geneva, 
Switzerland three days later. During the meeting, Lavrov apparently urged the 
Iranian government to show “maximum” cooperation to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), especially in regards to the new (formerly undeclared) 
facility, thereby allowing the international community to “move towards a solution” 
on the proliferation question. (1) Lavrov also advised Tehran that it “should show 
restraint” with its missile testing program ahead of the talks, since further 
launches would only increase international concern. (2) 
 
Russia’s warnings and pressure (however stringent they may have been) would 
appear to have had some effect, as Tehran agreed in principle to allow 
inspectors access to the aforementioned nuclear plant at Qom, (3) and also 
agreed to export low-grade uranium produced in Iran, to France, Russia and the 
United States, where it can be monitored and turned into fuel rods for a reactor. 
(4) Theoretically, this agreement would allow the aforementioned nuclear powers 
to ensure that the enriched element is used only for peaceful purposes, rather 
than to build nuclear weapons. Although a further round of international talks on 
Iran is to be held late in October, the issue has not been off the table since the 
end of the Geneva discussions. 
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On 12 October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Moscow for talks with 
Lavrov and President Medvedev. In a joint press conference with Lavrov, Clinton 
claimed that Russia had been “extremely cooperative” with the international 
community over Iran, (5) and stated that the question of sanctions had not been 
discussed because the timing was not “appropriate” given where the “process” 
currently stands. (6) It is important to note that neither Lavrov nor Clinton has 
dismissed sanctions out of hand, should the current inspections and talks fail to 
bear fruit. The former noted that such action would be counter-productive in the 
“current situation,” while the latter would seek to “rally” world opinion behind 
economic measures, if necessary. (7) (There is no deviation in the American and 
Russian views of Iran, according to the Russian Foreign Minister.) 
 
The question of an extension, renewal or replacement of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) also was on the agenda in Moscow. Lavrov claimed 
that “significant advancement” had been made in the attempt to reach agreement 
before START’s 5 December 2009 expiry date, with both sides apparently willing 
to reduce their stockpiles to between 1500 and 1675 warheads each. (8) 
 
It seems evident that Russia’s apparent new cooperative attitude on arms 
reduction talks and Iran is due to President Barak Obama’s efforts to reset 
relations, as well as to the President’s decision to scrap the East European 
based Missile Defense system in favor of the naval based Aegis system. 
 
Just how cooperative Moscow is, on the Iranian issue will become clear at the 
end of this month, after inspectors have visited Qom and after the next round of 
talks have taken place. Will the Kremlin push Iran for full disclosure? Will 
Moscow come on board if tough sanctions against Iran are deemed necessary by 
the Security Council, or will it exercise its Veto? 
 
Countering NGOs & technology 
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Late in September, the Heads of CIS Security Services met in Aktau, 
Kazakhstan. Although a number of vital issues, including terrorism, were 
discussed, one of the key points raised at the meeting according to FSB Chief 
Alexander Bortnikov, was the fear of “interference in the affairs of sovereign 
countries” by “Western NGOs,” and their ability to ferment “so-called color 
revolutions.”(9) Bortnikov claimed that many western NGOs, rather than being 
“private structures,” are shell organizations controlled and funded by their parent 
national governments. (10) The Security Services, according to Bortnikov, must 
develop effective countermeasures against such interference – what those might 
be is not yet clear. (11) 
 
As well as developing countermeasures against foreign interference, the FSB is 
seeking to impose ever tighter domestic surveillance: According to an article in 
Novaya gazeta late in September, the Security Services increasingly are 
concerned by modern cell phones without keypads that can be used as internet 
devices, in addition to making phone calls. According to an “unnamed source” in 
the “Russian internet” business, the FSB believes that the sale of these devices 
must be monitored, and that buyers should be required to present their passports 
(rather than any other form of identification), when signing a contract. (12) It 
seems self-evident that the concerns about foreign NGOs fomenting unrest and 
the use of communication devices are linked: the Security Services clearly are 
aware that technology played a significant role in organizing and coordinating 
protests during the Orange and Rose Revolutions, and it appears that they are 
attempting to forestall any possibility, however remote, such mass protests might 
occur in Russia in the foreseeable future. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia Urges Iran to Cooperate With IAEA,” ITAR-TASS, 28 Sep 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(2) “Russia Urges Iran to Show Restraint As Missile Exercises Cause Concern,” 
ITAR-TASS, 28 Sep 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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(3) “Accords Reached with Iran ‘Inspire Cautious Optimism’—Russia’s Lavrov,” 
Interfax, 2 Oct 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(4) “FYI—Lavrov Says Russia May Process Spent Nuclear Fuel From Iran,” Vesti 
TV, 5 Oct 09; OSC Summary via World News Connection. (5) “Hillary Clinton 
Praises Russia over Iran Crisis,” The Daily Telegraph, 13 Oct 09 via 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6315847/Hillary-Clinton-
praises-Russia-over-Iran-crisis.html. 
(6) “Russia and US Unite on Iran Bomb Threat and Plan to Cut Nuclear 
Weapons,” The Times of London, 13 Oct 09 via 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6872687.ece. 
(7) Ibid.  
(8) Ibid.  
(9) “CIS Special Services Need Mechanism to Deal With Some Western NGOs-
Bortnikov, Interfax, 25 Sep 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(10) “Russian FSB Chief Calls for ‘Mechanism’ to Stop ‘Interference’ by Western 
NGOs, Report Based on Material from Interfax: ‘FSB: Certain Western NGOs are 
Interfering in CIS Affairs,’” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep 09; OSC Translated 
Text via World News Connection. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Russia: Security Services Seek Control Over Wireless Connectivity, Article 
by Yuriy Revich titled “Cell Phone to Become Passport,” Novaya gazeta, 25 Sep 
09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Russia’s military industrial complex struggles to modernize 
Russia’s military industrial complex is struggling to meet the demands of 
modernizing the military.  On September 4, Russian Deputy Defense Minister 
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Popovkin, in a hearing at the Public Chamber stated, “Russia should buy arms 
abroad if its own industry cannot come up with the goods.” (1)  Deputy Minister 
Popovkin’s unguarded comments during the hearing indicate the precarious 
position of the defense industry.  Although Russia’s defense industry apparently 
has begun to recover from a low point in the late 1990s, significant technological, 
financial, and managerial challenges continue, placing it at a disadvantage at 
home and abroad.  
 
Acquiring modern and innovative technology is a priority for Russian leadership.  
On October 6, Russian President Medvedev, in his opening address to the 
Moscow International Nanotechnology Forum stated, “…what we really need is 
the transfer of high technologies and their adaptation to Russian industries…this 
is the most difficult challenge, and so far in this regard we have had very little 
success.” (2)  Russia’s current inability to develop innovative nanotechnology is 
endemic to its military development efforts in advanced technology, as well.  
According to one Russian defense analyst, the Russian defense industry has 
“lost…many of its most important technologies” and begun to “lag behind the 
west in communications, reconnaissance, navigation, observation, EW 
[Electronic Warfare] and control systems.” (3)  Confirming these statements, 
Deputy Minster Popovkin recently admitted that the “Defense Ministry is forced to 
purchase technologies abroad because Russia’s electronics industry is incapable 
of manufacturing all necessary parts and microcircuits for weapon production.” 
(4)    
 
This shortfall is substantiated by Russia’s acquisition of Israeli Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) and recent negotiations with France to acquire the state of the 
art Mistral class helicopter carrier/command and control ship. (5)  Russia decided 
to buy Israeli UAVs after the Defense Ministry invested nine billion rubles to 
develop the technology in Russia with no return. (6)  Regarding the Israeli UAV 
purchase, Deputy Minister Popovkin stated, “…why should we not buy them so 
as at least [to] learn how to use them?” (7)  In the case of the Mistral class 
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helicopter carrier, Russia not only plans to acquire the ship, but also to “study the 
methodology of building an aircraft carrier for the Russian Navy.”(8)  In addition, 
Prime Minister Putin stated that Russia is “prepared to cooperate with the West 
in producing joint weapons systems based upon NATO standards.  And if such 
cooperation takes place, Russia is prepared to purchase these weapons.” (9)  
Russia’s Defense Ministry is working to find partners who are willing to transfer or 
to develop jointly high technology systems to shore up its lagging high tech 
defense industry.  
 
Further evidence of Russia’s disappointing high technology defense industry 
resides in Russia’s record of arms exports.  According to Anatoliy Isaykin, 
General Director of Rosoboroneksport, Russia’s share of “science-intensive” 
products sold in the export market has dropped from 6% in 1990 to 0.2% in 2008. 
(10)  Isaykin stated, “this has to do with the fact that Moscow spends one-fourth 
of what Japan, one-third of what Germany, and one-half of what the Czech 
Republic spends on scientific-research and experimental-design work.” (11)  
Moreover, short-term development of new high technology weapons does not 
look promising.  Russia’s 2010 budget has slashed 25 billion rubles from its 163 
billion ruble weapons development budget in 2009. (12) 
 
Financial woes are another factor plaguing Russia’s military industrial complex.  
In the first quarter of 2009, the entire defense industry received only one-tenth of 
its expected operating budget. (13)  Such funding shortfalls, along with 
substantial debt and payment arrears, significantly affect the industry’s ability to 
manage costs and produce quality products in a timely manner.  Several 
examples of the industry’s stress include the declaration of bankruptcy by 
Russia-based Izhmash, manufacturer of the Avtomat Kalishnikova 47 (AK-47) 
assault rifle in September 2009. (14)  Also, Avangard Shipyard has failed to pay 
120 workers since May 2009 as the company attempts to settle old tax debts 
dating from the 1990s.  (15)  Finally, Russia’s aviation industry is 121 billion 
rubles in debt. (16) Prime Minister Putin voiced his concern saying, “…the state 
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does not intend to endlessly cover the losses of aircraft building industrial 
enterprises.” (17)  
 
Amid shortfalls in high technology investment and serious financial strains, 
competition in the market is forcing Russia’s military industrial complex to re-
engineer itself.  Prime Minister Putin stated, “…budgeted funds must primarily aid 
in establishing truly competitive companies that are functioning in a market 
system.” (18)  This is no small challenge for an industry emerging into a post-
Cold War environment.  The industry is just starting to address challenges such 
as corporate raiding, product diversification, and quality control.  Reported quality 
control setbacks and woeful single source producers in the “Bulava” missile 
program are indicative of these issues. (19)  Consequently, the Defense Ministry 
is pressuring its military industries to make vast improvements in “organizational 
structuring and technological retooling” to prevent Russia from becoming a 
“second-rate power.” (20)  
 
Russia’s defense industry is under great pressure to undertake ambitious 
industry reform and to provide high technology weapons systems to the Russian 
military.  The Defense Ministry already has warned Russia’s military industrial 
complex that defense contracts are not “social security” for the industry. (21)  
Notably, some of its international customers have given notice to Russia’s 
defense industry.  Currently, India’s military uses about 70% Russian equipment, 
but is planning to spend $100 billion over the next ten years to update and 
modernize its aging Soviet arsenal. (22)  According to Indian military officials, the 
high costs of Russian military equipment along with quality control issues are 
leading India to court other suppliers. (23)  Although India recognizes its long-
standing relationship with Russia’s arms producers, Indian Defense Ministry 
spokesperson Sitanshu Kar acknowledged that the relationship is changing. (24)  
If Russia’s defense industry fails to reform and to address its weaknesses, it risks 
becoming an irrelevant industry at home and abroad. 
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Source Notes: 
(1) Russian Defense Ministry, Industry Delegates Heard on Plans to Buy Arms 
Abroad, 6 Sep 09; Interfax-AVN Military News Agency Website via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(2) Russia: Medvedev Addresses Opening of Moscow International 
Nanotechnology Forum, President of Russia – Official Website of the Russian 
Federation President, 7 Oct 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
(3) Russian Expert Supports Weapons Imports for Armed Forces, Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 18 Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) Russia: No Iskanders Deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast for No BMD in Eastern 
Europe, Vzglyad, 21 Sep 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
(5) Vzglyad, 21 Sep 09, ibid; Russian CGS’ Statements on North Korea, Bulava, 
Mistral, Military Bases Noted, Vremya novostey, 9 Sep 09 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(6) Russian Defense Ministry, Industry Delegates Heard on Plans to Buy Arms 
Abroad, ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8 Vzglyad, 21 Sep 09, ibid. 
(9) PM Putin Says Russia is Prepared to Work with NATO on Development of 
Weapon Systems Built on NATO Standards, Gazeta Online, 18 Sep 09; OSCE 
Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(10) Russia: Military-Industrial Complex Falling Behind Production of High-Tech 
Arms, Novaya politika, 30 Sep 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Basic Bankruptcy, Daily Deal, 24 Sep 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 17 
(15) Prosecutors Demand Russian Defence Plant Staff Be Paid Wage Arrears, 
RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(16) Kukushkin On Substance of Putin Meeting on Aviation Industry, Debt 
Consolidation, While at MAKS-2009, Vremya novostey, 2 Sep 09; OSCE 
Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(17) Kukushkin On Substance of Putin Meeting on Aviation Industry, Debt 
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